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JAPANESE BANKS: TAIL RISK AND 
CAPITAL BUFFERS 
 
David E Allen*, Akhmad R Kramadibrata*, Robert J Powell* and  
Abhay Kumar Singh* 
 
This paper applies quantile regression to a structural credit model to investigate the 
impact of extreme bank asset value fluctuations on capital adequacy and default 
probabilities (PD) of Japanese Banks. Quantile regression allows modelling of the 
extreme quantiles of a distribution which allows measurement of capital and PDs at 
the most extreme points of an economic downturn, when banks are most likely to fail. 
Outcomes are compared to traditional structural measures. We find highly significant 
variances in capital adequacy and default probabilities between quantiles, and show 
how these variances can assist banks and regulators in calculating capital buffers to 
sustain banks through volatile times. 
 
Keywords: quantile regression, Japanese banks, probability of default, capital 
adequacy 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The global financial crisis (GFC) has highlighted the devastating effect that high 
credit risk can have on financial markets and economic stability. Whilst default 
probabilities of banks are generally low, even during a downturn of a normal business 
cycle, this can change during extreme downturns such as seen in the GFC. During this 
period, impaired assets (problem loans) of banks more than trebled in the US and UK. 
161 banks failed in the US in the two years 2008 to 2009 as compared to three in 2007 
and none in the prior two years (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2010). Bank 
capital shortages led to the need for government financial rescue packages for banks 
in the US, UK and many other countries. Share markets plunged, and economic 
stimulus packages and slashing of interest rates were required to shore up major world 
economies. In short, the subject of credit risk in extreme circumstances has become 
one of the most important and intensely scrutinised topics in finance today.  
Japan is a particularly important market to study in a credit context, with Japanese 
banks having experienced a prolonged series of crises, commencing with the bursting 
of an asset price bubble (real estate and stock prices) in the early 1990s, followed by 
the Asian Crisis which commenced in the late 1990s, and then to top it off, the GFC 
from 2007 onwards. Japan is considered to have fared better than the US and 
European markets during the GFC, due to a lower exposure to sub-prime securities 
and higher credit standards. The latter was as a result of lessons learned during prior 
crises, resulting in substantially lower non-performing loans as compared to the 
situation in the early 2000s (see Section II for details). Against this background, using 
quantile regression, we show how despite having fared better than global peers, based 
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on fluctuating asset values the default probabilities and capital adequacy of Japanese 
banks were severely impacted during the GFC.    
Many prevailing credit models were designed to measure ‘average’ credit risks over a 
period, or credit risk at a specific point in time. The problem with these approaches is 
that they are not designed to measure extreme losses, i.e. the tail of the credit loss 
distribution. It is precisely during these extreme circumstances when firms are most 
likely to fail. Some examples of well-known models in this category include the z 
score (Altman, 1968, 2000) which uses five balance sheet ratios to predict bankruptcy; 
Moody’s KMV Company (2003) RiskCalc model, which uses 11 financial measures 
to provide an Estimated Default Frequency (EDF) for private firms; Ratings agencies 
which provide credit ratings based on customer creditworthiness, but which are not 
designed to ratchet up and down with changing market conditions; CreditMetrics 
(Gupton, Finger, & Bhatia, 1997) which incorporates credit ratings into a transition 
matrix that measures the probability of transitioning from one rating to another, 
including the probability of default; and the Basel Accord standardised approach 
which measures corporate credit risk for capital adequacy purposes by applying risk 
weightings to customers on the basis of their external credit rating. 
Other models use Value at Risk (VaR), one of the most widely used approaches for 
measuring credit and market risk by banks, which measures risks falling below a pre-
determined threshold at a selected level of confidence, such as 95% or 99%. A key 
shortfall of this approach is that it says nothing of risk beyond VaR and it is usually 
based on a normal distribution Gaussian approach which does not adequately capture 
tail risk. Critics have included Standard and Poor’s analysts (Samanta, Azarchs, & 
Hill, 2005) due to inconsistency of VaR application across institutions and lack of tail 
risk assessment. Artzner, Delbaen, Eber, & Heath (1999; 1997) found VaR to have 
undesirable mathematical properties (most notably lack of sub-additivity), whereas 
Pflug (2000) proved that Conditional Value at Risk (CvaR), which looks at losses 
beyond VaR, does not have these undesirable properties. In assessing why existing 
credit models failed in the credit crisis, Sy (2008) finds that most existing credit 
models are based on a reduced form linear approach which have typical reliance on 
having large amounts of statistical data coming from a quasi-equilibrium state, and 
that this approach is ineffective in making even short-term forecasts in rapidly 
changing environments such as in a credit crisis. The study finds that such inductive 
models have failed to predict what would happen just when they were most needed to. 
Hedge fund returns have also been found to deviate from the VaR Gaussian approach 
(Bali, Gokcan, & Liang, 2007; Gupta & Liang, 2005). Jackson, Maude & Perraudin 
(1998) found that VaR estimates based on a simulation approach outperformed VaR 
estimates based on a Gaussian approach. Ohran and Karaahmet (2009) found that VaR 
works well when the economy is functioning smoothly, but fails during times of 
economic stress, because VaR is ignorant of the extreme losses beyond VaR.  
This study uses the Merton (1974) structural model with modifications made by 
Moody’s KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003), which we hereafter refer to as the 
Merton/KMV model (described in Section III). This model does measure fluctuating 
risk over time using a combination of the structure of the customer’s balance sheet and 
movements in market asset values to calculate default probabilities. However, again 
this is based on an ‘average’ over the time period measured, and does not highlight the 
extreme quantiles within the measured period. 
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Credit models which do not adequately measure tail risk could lead to banks having 
under-provisions or capital shortages during extreme economic circumstances. During 
the GFC, many global banks were not adequately prepared to deal with the extent of 
defaults and impaired assets during this time, and were left scrambling for capital and 
funding just when it was most difficult to obtain. Per the International Monetary Fund 
(Caruana & Narain, 2008), “it (Basel) does emphasise that banks should address 
volatility in their capital allocation and define strategic plans for raising capital that 
take into account their needs, especially in a stressful economic environment”. The 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2008) stated that capital adequacy 
requirements should include “introducing a series of measures to promote the build-up 
of capital buffers in good times that can be drawn upon in periods of stress. A 
countercyclical capital framework will contribute to a more stable banking system, 
which will help dampen, instead of amplify, economic and financial shocks”. Indeed, 
Basel III includes requirements for such capital buffers. Capital, as pointed out by the 
Bank of England (2008), reduces during a downturn period due to declining market 
based asset values and under these circumstances a mark-to-market approach provides 
a measure of how much capital needs to be raised to restore confidence in a bank’s 
market capitalisation. Inadequate focus on potential tail risk meant many banks were 
unprepared and undercapitalised to deal with the extreme events of the GFC. 
This research addresses a major gap in existing credit models. Whereas existing 
models focus on ‘average risk’ or risk below a defined threshold, we use quantile 
regressions to divide the data into different tranches, enabling the researcher to isolate 
and model the most risky tranches. Quantile regression, as introduced by Koenker and 
Bassett (1978) has successfully measured extreme market risk (share prices) as it is 
more robust to the presence of outliers than other prediction methods such as Ordinary 
Least Squares. Quantile regression has been applied to a range of market risk models, 
notably by Nobel economics laureate Robert Engle, who together with Manganelli 
(Engle & Manganelli, 2004) applied them to a suite of CAViaR (Conditional 
Autoregressive Value at Risk) models. The authors make the point that modelling 
techniques must be responsive to financial disasters, and that existing VaR techniques 
are inadequate as they only focus on one particular quantile. By not properly 
estimating risk, financial institutions can underestimate (or overestimate) the risk, 
consequently maintaining excessively high (low) capital. Their CAViaR models are 
unique in that instead of modelling a single distribution, they can directly model 
different quantiles, including the tail of the distribution.  
This project is unique and innovative in that it extends quantile regression techniques 
from market risk applications to structural credit risk models. The remainder of the 
paper is organised as follows. Section II will examine the Japanese banking industry. 
Sections III and IV will discuss key metrics used in this paper including the 
Merton/KMV model (and its associated Distance to Default and Probability of Default 
measures) and quantile regression. Section V includes Data and Methodology. Results 
are presented in Section VI, followed by Conclusions in Section VII.   
II. THE JAPANESE BANKING INDUSTRY 
The financial services industry in Japan has been undergoing a reorganisation since 
the 1990s, triggered by the Japanese asset price bubble bursting. This was the start of 
a decade-long recession (referred to as the lost decade). Aggressive economic 
Japanese Banks: Tail Risk and Capital Buffers 
10 
stimulation took place, including rate reductions which started in 1991 virtually 
reaching zero in 1995. The late 1990s heralded the Asian Financial Crisis followed by 
further economic stimulation and capital injections into undercapitalised financial 
institutions, together with outright purchase by the Bank of Japan of banks’ asset 
backed commercial paper and asset backed securities (Shirakawa, 2010). Non-
performing loans (NPLs) reached a peak of 8.5% in 2002, dropping steadily thereafter 
to 1.4% in 2007 (Bank of Japan, 2009a). Over the period of the Asian Financial Crisis, 
market values of stocks, particularly in the financial sector, fell dramatically. The 
Nikkei 500 Bank index, per Datastream, showed a drop of 78% from June 1996, 
bottoming in March 2003 with most of this drop (55%) taking place pre-2000. 
The GFC saw the NPL ratio increase for the first time in seven years to 1.7% at end 
2008 and 1.9% at end 2009, still substantially lower than the figure in 2002. In 2008, 
both the major banks and the regional banks recorded net losses for the first time after 
2003. A range of measures to address the crisis included cutting policy rates, 
introducing special fund supplying operations to facilitate corporate finance, and 
introducing measures to insure the stability of financial markets. In 2009, the Bank of 
Japan (BOJ) resumed its purchases of stocks (which had commenced in the 1990s) 
held by financial institutions. A ‘policy package to address the economic crisis’ was 
introduced in April 2009. This included encouragement (and extension) of the use of 
the measures which were already available in the Act on Special Measures for 
Strengthening Financial Functions. To support funding for small firms, additional 
emergency guarantee facilities were made available by the credit guarantee 
corporations. In 2009 BOJ expanded the range of eligible collateral for loans on deed 
to the government and those with government guarantees.  
Currently, the banking industry is centralised into three Mega Banks; they are 
Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group, Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group and Mizuho 
Financial Group. These three banks came into being through various mergers of large 
banks to consolidate their standing capital ratios in the light of Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) regulation regarding capital adequacy ratios for international banks. 
With the reforms, many regional and international banks have either merged or 
dissolved. There are many categories of banks in Japan including the Mega Banks, 
Regional Banks, Money Center Banks, On-line Banks and Trust Banks (see Table 1 
for the 10 largest Banks). There are 47 prefectures in Japan and in each prefecture 
there are at least two banks operating. Overall the number of banks operating in Japan 
is over 150, with the three Mega Banks having assets totalling over $US5 trillion 
representing over 50% of total assets of all Japanese banks. 
The Japanese banking regulator is the Financial Services Agency (FSA). BOJ is not a 
regulator, but “contributes to the maintenance of an orderly financial system” 
(Tamaki, 2008), including on and off-site monitoring of banks. BOJ (2009b) 
recognises the importance of holding additional capital to sustain banks through 
downturn periods: “Japan’s financial institutions should strengthen their capital bases. 
They need to be able to cope with the risks that might materialise due to the changes 
in economic and financial circumstances”.  
At March 2010, Japanese banks in this study had weighted average equity ratios just 
over 5% (see Table 1, which includes size and capital adequacy data). This compares 
to 2009 equity ratios (2010 not yet available) for banks in Australia of 6.2%, Canada 
5.2%, Europe (excludes UK) 3.2%, UK 3.9%, and US 7.1% (Allen & Powell, 2010). 
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TABLE 1: DATA COMPARISON OF KEY JAPANESE BANKS IN OUR STUDY 
 
Banks 
Market 
Capitalisation 
(USD $bn) 
Assets  
(USD $bn) 
Equity 
Ratio 
Tier 1 
Capital 
Ratio 
Total 
Capital 
Ratio 
Mitsubishi Financial Group 74.14 2,177.44 5.55% 11.18% 14.87% 
Sumitomo Financial Group 46.20 1,310.26 5.72% 11.15% 15.02% 
Mizuho Financial Group 30.66 1,666.53 3.75% 9.09% 13.46% 
Resona Holdings 14.56 433.39 5.61% 10.81% 13.81% 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking 9.82 219.09 7.08% 9.88% 14.17% 
Bank of Yokohama 6.67 127.60 6.39% 9.85% 12.20% 
Chuo Mitsui Trust & Holding 6.23 158.69 5.71% 9.86% 13.80% 
Shizuoka Bank 6.07 96.72 7.96% 14.06% 15.32% 
Chiba Bank 5.35 109.25 5.93% 11.39% 12.80% 
Mizuho Trust & Banking 5.05 63.02 5.32% 10.07% 15.73% 
Others (average) 1.21 37.80 5.08% 9.04% 11.12% 
Total 275.25 8,542.56 5.33% 9.27% 11.53% 
Market Capitalisation, Assets and Equity figures are obtained from DataStream at 30 March 2010. Tier 
1, Total Capital, and Equity ratios were obtained from individual companies’ financial reports for the 
year ending March 2010, with total ratios representing asset-weighted averages. The equity ratio is the 
book value (per March 2010 annual financial reports) of Equity to Total Assets.  
III. DISTANCE TO DEFAULT AND PROBABILITY OF DEFAULT 
The Merton/KMV approach (which we use in this study, but modify to incorporate 
quantiles) provides an estimate of distance to default (DD) and probability of default 
(PD). The model holds that there are three key determinants of default: the asset 
values of a firm, the risk of fluctuations in those asset values, and leverage (the extent 
to which the assets are funded by borrowings as opposed to equity). The firm defaults 
when debt exceeds assets, and DD measures how far away the firm is from this default 
event. KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003), in modelling defaults using their extensive 
worldwide database, find that firms do not generally default when asset values reach 
liability book values, and many continue to service their debts at this point as the long-
term nature of some liabilities provides some breathing space. KMV finds the default 
point to lie somewhere between total liabilities and current liabilities and therefore use 
current liabilities plus half of long term debt as the default point (we follow this debt 
definition in this study). It should also be noted that, while both Merton and KMV use 
the DD approach outlined below, Merton calculates PD per equation 2, whereas KMV 
instead align the DD with default probabilities obtained from their extensive database 
to produce Estimated Default Frequencies (EDFs). As we do not have access to the 
KMV database, we use equation 2 in our Merton/KMV model to obtain our PDs. This 
will have no impact on our capital buffer measurements as we obtain these from DD 
rather than PD. 
T
TFVDD
V
V
σ
σµ )5.0()/ln( 2−+
=  (1) 
)( DDNPD −=  (2) 
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Where V = market value of firm’s assets; F = face value of firm’s debt (in line with 
KMV, defined as current liabilities plus one half of long-term debt); µ = an estimate of 
the annual return (drift) of the firm’s assets (we measure µ as the mean of the change in 
lnV of the period being modelled as per Vassalou & Xing (2004); N = cumulative 
standard normal distribution function; T = time horizon (for which we use one year in 
line with usual practice); σV = volatility (standard deviation) of firms’ asset values. 
To estimate the σV component of equation 1, we follow the estimation, iteration and 
convergence procedure shown below, as outlined by studies such as Bharath & 
Shumway (2009), Vassalou & Xing (2009), and Allen and Powell (2009). 
)()( 21 dFNedVNE
rT−−=  (3) 
Where E = market value of firms equity, and r = risk free rate.  
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Volatility and equity are related under the Merton model as follows: 
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Per the approach of KMV (Crosbie & Bohn, 2003) and Bharath & Shumway (2008), 
initial asset returns are estimated from historical equity data using the formula: 






+
=
FE
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EV σσ
               
(7) 
Daily log equity returns and their standard deviations are calculated for each asset for 
the historical period. These asset returns derived above are applied to equation 3 to 
estimate the market value of assets every day. The daily log asset return is calculated 
and new asset values estimated. Following KMV, this process is repeated until asset 
returns converge (repeated until difference in adjacent σ’s is less than 10-3). These 
figures are then used to calculate DD per equation 1. 
IV. QUANTILE REGRESSION 
Quantile regression per Koenker & Basset (1978) and Koenker and Hallock (2001) 
divides a dataset into parts. Minimising the sum of symmetrically weighted absolute 
residuals yields the median where 50% of observations fall either side. Similarly, 
other quantile functions are yielded by minimising the sum of asymmetrically 
weighted residuals, where the weights are functions of the quantile in question per 
equation 8. This makes quantile regression robust to the presence of outliers. min𝜀∈𝑅 ∑ 𝑝𝑟(𝑦𝑖 − 𝜀)   (8) 
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where 𝑝𝑟(.) is the absolute value function, providing the 𝑟
th sample quantile with its 
solution.  
Figure 1 (Steiner, 2011) illustrates quantile regression. The x and y axes represent any 
two variables being compared (such as age and height; or market returns and 
individual asset returns). The 50% quantile (middle line) is the median, where 50% of 
observations fall below the line and 50% above. Similarly, the 90% quantile (top line) 
is where 10% of observations lie above the line, and the 10% quantile (bottom line) 
has 90% of observations above the line. The intercept and slope are obtained by 
minimising the sum of the asymmetrically weighted residuals for each line.  
 
FIGURE 1: ILLUSTRATIVE QUANTILE REGRESSION EXAMPLE  
 
The quantile regression technique allows direct modelling of the tails of a distribution 
rather than ‘average’ methods such as ordinary least squares or credit models which 
focus on ‘average’ losses over a period of time. The technique has enjoyed wide 
application such as investigations into wage structure (Buschinsky, 1994; Machado & 
Mata, 2005), production efficiency (Dimelis & Lowi, 2002), and educational 
attainment (Eide & Showalter, 1998). Financial applications include Engle & 
Manganelli (2004) and Taylor (2008) to VaR problems, and Barnes and Hughes 
(2002) who use quantile regression analysis to study CAPM in their work on stock 
market returns. In a stock market context, Beta measures the systematic risk of an 
individual security with CAPM predicting what a particular asset or portfolio’s 
expected return should be relative to its risk and the market return. The lower and 
upper extremes of the distribution are often not well fitted by OLS. Allen et al. (2009), 
using quantile regression, show large and significant differences between returns and 
beta, across quantiles and through time. These distribution extremes are especially 
important to credit risk measurement as it at these times when failure is most likely. 
We expand these quantile techniques to credit risk by measuring Betas for fluctuating 
assets across time and quantiles, and the corresponding impact of these quantile 
measurements on DD, PD and capital, as outlined in the methodology section.  
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V. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We use all banks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for which data is available on 
Datastream (69 Banks in total as per Appendix 4). These banks have a market cap of 
USD$275 billion and assets of $8.5 trillion. Ten years data is used, split into two 
periods to compare how the banks were affected during the GFC as compared to pre-
GFC. The GFC period includes the three years from January 2007 to December 2009. 
The pre-GFC period includes the seven years from January 2000 to December 2006.  
Seven years aligns with the Basel II advanced method for measuring credit risk. The 
early years of this period include the latter years of the Asian Financial Crisis as well 
as the ensuing recovery period. These are the seven years that banks, under the 
advanced model, would have used to measure credit risk (and determine capital 
requirements) going into the GFC, usually based on average risk over that period. By 
comparing this to actual GFC data, we can determine how adequate these capital 
requirements would have been. In addition to pre-GFC and GFC periods, we measure 
2008 as a single year. This year was the height of the GFC, and as it is during the most 
extreme period that banks are likely to fail, it is important that we isolate and measure 
extreme periods.  
We calculate DD and PD for each bank for each period using the methodology in 
Section III, with our “All Bank” figures being asset weighted averages. Quantiles for 
each period are calculated per Section IV, with two fundamental differences. Firstly, 
quantile Beta analysis is normally applied to share prices, whereas we use daily 
market asset values (per methodology in Section III). Secondly, share Betas are 
normally measured as individual share returns against the market. We instead compare 
risk measurements between two different periods (e.g. GFC v pre-GFC) and between 
different quantiles within those periods. Here we introduce the new concept of a 
benchmark DD (together with the associated PD and asset value standard deviation), 
to ascertain what buffer capital is needed when asset values fall below the benchmark. 
To explain this concept, assume a bank (or regulator) deems that the aggregate bank 
capital (leverage) ratio was adequate based on the seven year pre-GFC asset volatility, 
and sets this as the benchmark capital (K). For our example we will assume a 
benchmark ratio of 5% (which is approximately the weighted average pre-GFC equity 
ratios for Japanese Banks per Table 1). Let us assume the portfolio of banks in 
question has a theoretical DD of 3.276 for this period, which has an associated PD of 
0.058%. In its simplest form the Merton/KMV model is essentially a measure of 
capital (assets – liabilities) divided by the standard deviation of asset values. As 
volatility increases, DD (and hence capital) reduces proportionately. As asset value 
volatility is the denominator of the Merton/KMV model, doubling of volatility (σ2/σ1 
= 2) means that DD and capital (K) halve, and capital will have to be doubled (i.e. a 
capital buffer of 5% held) to restore the benchmark DD to its original value. Thus any 
asset fluctuations and increase in DD above the benchmark value require a 
corresponding percentage capital increase. We therefore measure capital buffers 
required to counter extreme fluctuations as: 
Required Capital Buffer = (σ2/σ1 K) – K     (9) 
The capital buffer will have a minimum of zero as capital should not fall below the 
benchmark. The benchmark is illustrated in Figure 2, which shows a situation where 
the capital benchmark is 5% and actual volatility (and hence DD) has increased by 
1.7x benchmark (σ2/σ1 = 1.7).  
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FIGURE 2: ILLUSTRATION OF REQUIRED CAPITAL BUFFER USING A BENCHMARK 
 
In this study, we measure the asset value fluctuations occurring in various quantiles of 
the GFC period against the pre-GFC benchmark. To allow measurement of the GFC 
period (or any other period within the 10 year sample period used) against the 
benchmark, we need a benchmark which covers the entire 10 years. We achieve this 
by bootstrapping the seven year pre-GFC returns and extending them to 2009. We use 
F tests to test for volatility between the benchmark and each quantile (results for these 
are discussed in Section VI and shown in Appendices tables 1b, 2b and 3b) for each 
selected period and bank, and between each quantile within each selected period 
(results discussed in Section VI and shown in Appendices tables 1c, 2c and 3c). F is 
σ22/σ
2
1, whereby a value of 1 shows no difference between the two samples measured 
(e.g. difference in variance between two quantiles) and a value of 3 shows variance of 
3x higher for one of the two samples than the other. We use * to denote significance at 
the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. As per our example, we need to assume a 
benchmark capital level for which we will use 5%, which approximates the overall 
capital level of aggregated Japanese banks per Table 1. 
When referring to “All Japanese Banks” or “All Banks” in this study we are referring 
to the 69 banks in our study. In addition to using the aggregated position for all 69 
banks (for which we use asset weighted averages to obtain the total DD and PD for all 
banks), we select two banks to illustrate our model. These are Sumitomo Mitsui 
Financial Group (SMFG) which is a major bank and Shizuoka Regional Bank which 
is a regional bank. The reason we have chosen these banks is simply because they are 
very different in terms of size, product range and capital ratios, thus allowing us to 
illustrate the model across different bank profiles. A summary of the profile of these 
banks is given in Appendix 5.   
VI. RESULTS 
Table 2 shows how DD and PD differ from year to year in our 10 year sample period. 
2001 and 2002 were periods of high volatility for Japanese banks, although as noted in 
the introduction section, much of the downturn in equity and asset values arising from 
the Asian Financial Crisis had already occurred prior to year 2000. The mid-2000s 
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were a period of low volatility and default probabilities, with 2008 (the height of the 
GFC) showing a substantial increase in risk as indicated by these measures, reducing 
again in 2009.  
 
TABLE 2: ANNUAL DD AND PD FOR ALL JAPANESE BANKS FROM 2000-2009 
 
Year DD PD 
2000 4.20 <0.01% 
2001 2.07 1.93% 
2002 2.21 1.37% 
2003 6.99 <0.01% 
2004 5.71 <0.01% 
2005 8.36 <0.01% 
2006 5.85 <0.01% 
2007 2.78 0.27% 
2008 0.99 16.13% 
2009 2.77 0.28% 
Distance to Default (DD) and Probability of Default (PD) for each year is calculated per Section III. In 
summary, DD is the number of standard deviations that asset values are away from falling below debt 
values, based on asset value volatility. PD is calculated from DD and is the probability corresponding to 
the standard normal distribution. Figures are asset value weighted averages of all Japanese banks in our 
sample. 
Table 3 provides a summary of outcomes for All Banks across all the periods 
measured, split into quantiles. Moving left to right within each of the segments in 
Table 3, the periods become more risky (the GFC period on its own being more risky 
than the entire period from 2000-2009, and 2008 being the most volatile of the GFC 
years). For example, the entire period DD at the 50% level is 2.53 (PD 0.57%), 
whereas GFC DD for the same quantile is 1.45 (PD 7.36%), and 2008 on its own has a 
DD of 1.03 (PD 15.27%). 
 
TABLE 3: QUANTILE DISTRIBUTION OF KEY RISK INDICATORS 
 
Distance to Default  Beta (β) 
Quantile Pre-GFC + GFC GFC 2008  Quantile Pre-GFC + GFC GFC 2008 
5% 2.60 1.69 1.11  5% 1.01 1.54 2.00 
10% 2.57 1.62 1.09  10% 1.02 1.61 2.04 
50% 2.53 1.45 1.03  50% 1.07 1.80 2.16 
90% 2.50 1.35 0.88  90% 1.11 1.93 2.50 
95% 2.49 1.34 0.87  95% 1.12 1.95 2.56 
Probability of Default 
Figures are for All Banks. Distance to Default (DD), 
and Probability of Default (PD) are calculated per 
Section III. Beta (β) is the coefficient of the 
benchmark and quantile asset value fluctuations as 
discussed in Sections IV and V.  
Quantile Pre-GFC + GFC GFC 2008 
5% 0.47% 4.55% 13.37% 
10% 0.51% 5.24% 13.85% 
50% 0.57% 7.36% 15.27% 
90% 0.62% 8.84% 18.83% 
95% 0.65% 9.05% 19.34% 
Thus there is a dramatic increase in PDs during more risky times. There is also a shift 
in outcomes for different quantiles within each period. For example, PD almost 
doubles during the GFC from 4.55% (5% quantile) to 9.05% (95% quantile). A typical 
‘through the cycle’ OLS type approach using the Merton model, would produce 
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results around the 50% quantile level for the entire period (PD 0.57%), whereas we 
see that PDs in fact fluctuate from 0.47% at a lowest risk position (top left segment of 
the PD table) to 19.34% at a highest risk position (bottom right of the PD table) during 
the most extreme 5% of 2008. Given that firms are far more likely to fail during the 
most extreme segments than during an ‘average’ period, it is important for banks and 
regulators to understand the extent of these fluctuations to ensure adequate provisions 
and capital for these times. Using equation 9 and the standard deviation of asset 
values, we can estimate capital buffers (see Table 4) required to counter volatility. 
As risk increases, so too does β (as per the right-hand segment of Table 3) when 
comparing daily asset returns for each segment with the benchmark (which as per the 
methodology section, is based on the pre-GFC period). To illustrate this, we show 
selected β values (and corresponding DD and PD) in Figure 3. It is important to note 
that Figure 3 is not a quantile graph from any particular period, but is a β comparison 
across selected periods. We see that β of the entire 2000-2009 period against the 
benchmark is 1.07, increasing to 1.8 over the whole GFC period, then to 2.16 for 2008 
only, and to 2.56 at the height of the GFC period in 2008 at the 95% quantile. The 
graph clearly shows how PDs shift dramatically with rising β, ranging from 0.57% to 
19.5%. It should be noted, that as we are measuring volatility, there are no negative 
values in our graphs. Naturally, the standard deviations of the returns are calculated 
using both positive and negative returns.   
 
FIGURE 3: BETA COMPARISONS DURING KEY PERIODS – ALL BANKS  
 
Appendices 1 to 3 provide a graphical illustration of the quantile measures, together 
with summary statistical tables for our two example banks as compared to the 
aggregated values for All Banks, as well as the results for the F tests (as explained in 
Section V). Appendix 1 shows the entire 2000-2009 period, Appendix 2 shows the 
GFC years from 2007-2009 and Appendix 3 shows 2008 on its own. The values 
calculated per these appendices allow estimating and comparing of capital buffers 
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required to maintain capital at the benchmark value during extreme cycles for our 
sample banks as discussed in the next three paragraphs.  
Consolidated All Banks had DD for the three-year GFC period ranging from 1.69 at 
the 5% quantile to 1.34 at the 95% level, dropping to 0.87 at the 95% quantile for the 
2008 only period. The 95% GFC quantile asset value fluctuations exceed the 
benchmark by approximately 2x, requiring the average Japanese bank in our sample to 
double their existing equity ratio to maintain an adequate capital buffer to counter this. 
All of these GFC quantiles, even the lowest 5% quantile is significantly higher than 
the benchmark at a 99% confidence level using an F test.  
For Shizuoka Regional Bank, all quantiles during the GFC (and even more so during 
2008 only) had asset value standard deviations and DDs exceeding the benchmark at 
significant levels. Shizuoka’s asset volatility during the GFC 95% was approximately 
1.7x above the benchmark. However Shizuoka already has an equity ratio of 7.96% 
per table 1, which is 1.6x above the benchmark, so would only need a very small 
additional capital buffer to counter these fluctuations.  
Sumitomo Financial Group had very high levels of asset volatility during the GFC, 
ranging from DD 0.80 at the 5% quantile to 0.63 at the 95% quantile. This fell to 0.18 
at the most extreme quantile (95% in 2008). All of these GFC quantiles, even the 
lowest 5% quantile is significantly higher than the benchmark at a 99% confidence 
level using an F test. As the most extreme asset value fluctuations (at the GFC 95% 
quantile) are more than treble the benchmark, Sumitomo would need capital buffers 
significantly higher than the average Japanese bank to restore their capital and DD 
levels to the benchmark. 
The abovementioned F tests compared the quantiles to the benchmark we set, which is 
based on pre-GFC volatility. We also tested for differences in volatility between the 
quantiles in each bank (e.g. is the 95% quantile asset volatility significantly different 
to asset volatility for all quantiles such as would be measured by an OLS approach?). 
Here we note some differences between the banks. For Sumitomo the differences in 
variances between the quantiles in the various periods tend to be significant at the 
99% level, but for Shizuoka most quantile differences show lower significance, 
generally at the 95% level, showing that there is less extreme volatility (outliers) for 
Shizuoka as compared to Sumitomo. This is reflected in the quantile graphs for 
Shizuoka in the Appendices which show a narrower spread than the quantile graphs 
for All Banks and much narrower than Sumitomo.  
Table 4 compares buffer requirement outcomes of traditional credit modelling (using 
the KMV/Merton model to which no quantiles have been applied) to our model which 
divides the dataset into quantiles and time periods. The standard model over the 10-
year period is very similar to our 50% quantile model for this period, which as we saw 
in Figure 3 has β not much higher than 1, and results in very little additional capital 
being required for All Banks and Sumitomo, and none for Shizuoka who already has 
sufficient capital. To illustrate our model, we use the 95% GFC quantile, which shows 
significant capital buffers required at this point for All Banks and Sumitomo, with a 
small additional buffer required for Skizuoka. We could have used an even more 
extreme quantile (2008 95%) which would result in even higher required buffers at 
that point.    
International Journal of Business Studies – Special Edition 
19 
Shizuoka has been shown to have a higher DD (less risky) than All Banks, with 
Sumitomo having a lower DD (more risky). The DD calculation per equation 1 is 
essentially a measure of two key factors, being capital (the numerator being a measure 
of the distance between assets and liabilities) and asset volatility (the denominator). 
Thus it is necessary to identify which of these two factors is causing the variation in 
DD. Tables 1 and 4 show us that Shizuoka has a stronger capital position than 
Sumitomo. Shizuoka also has lower asset volatility than Sumitomo as evidenced by 
the lower F statistics in the Appendices for all of the periods. Thus Shizuoka’s lower 
risk is due to a combination of both higher capital and lower asset volatility.   
 
TABLE 4: REQUIRED CAPITAL BUFFER 
 
 All Banks Sumitomo Shizuoka 
Benchmark capital 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 
Traditional Modelling    
Capital required 5.38% 6.14% 5.26% 
Less: Existing capital 5.33% 5.72% 7.96% 
Additional capital buffer required 0.05% 0.42% -2.70% 
Our Extreme Modelling    
Capital required 10.45% 12.90% 9.35% 
Less: Existing capital 5.33% 5.72% 7.96% 
Additional capital buffer required 5.12% 7.18% 1.39% 
Traditional modelling in the above table is based on a standard Merton/KMV approach with no quantiles. 
This approximates our 50% quantile entire period model as per Figure 3. The extreme modelling period 
shown is based on our 95% GFC period. Existing capital is taken from Table 1. Calculation of capital 
buffers is as outlined in Section V, with the benchmark representing the pre-GFC period. 
Overall, our modelling approach measures fluctuations at extreme points, which the 
traditional modelling does not do. Fluctuations in asset values erode capital and our 
model, as per the methodology in Section V and results in Table 4, provides a method 
for measuring buffers required to maintain the capital position during extreme 
downturns. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has examined a new approach to measuring credit risk through cycles. 
Using quantile regression, the study has shown how market asset values can 
substantially change at different points, resulting in a wide range of DD and PD values 
for banks depending on the time period and quantile. Calculating credit risk based on 
averages through a cycle, or using static models which calculate risk at a single point 
in time, could lead to insufficient provisions and capital buffers by banks. This can 
lead to the situation, such as happened during the GFC, where banks are left 
scrambling for capital just when it is most difficult to raise. Bank failure is most likely 
during extreme economic downturns, and loss provisions and capital need to account 
for these circumstances. Our approach provides a method to banks and regulators for 
estimating capital buffers to sustain banks during extreme economic downturns.   
  
Japanese Banks: Tail Risk and Capital Buffers 
20 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
We would like to thank the anonymous referees for their extremely helpful 
suggestions in improving the paper. We also thank the Australian Research Council 
and Edith Cowan University for funding support. 
REFERENCES 
Allen, D.E., Gerrans, P., Singh, A.K., & Powell, R. (2009). Quantile Regression: Its 
Application in Investment Analysis. Jassa (4), 7-12. 
Allen, D.E., & Powell, R. (2009). Structural Credit Modelling and its Relationship to 
Market Value at Risk: An Australian Sectoral Perspective. In G.N. Gregoriou (Ed.), 
The VaR Implementation Handbook (pp. 403-414). New York: McGraw Hill. 
Allen, D.E., & Powell, R. (2010). The Fluctuating Default Risk of Australian Banks. 
Working Paper, Edith Cowan University. 
Altman, E.I. (1968). Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of 
Corporate Bankruptcy. Journal of Finance 189-209. 
Altman, E.I. (2000). Predicting Financial Distress of Companies: Revisiting the z-
score and Zeta® models. Retrieved 19 August 2009. Available at 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~ealtman/ 
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J., & Heath, D. (1999). Coherent Measures of Risk. 
Mathematical Finance, 9, 203-228. 
Artzner, P., Delbaen, F., Eber, J.M., & Heath, D. (1997). Thinking Coherently. Risk, 
10, 68-71. 
Bali, T.G., Gokcan, S., & Liang, B. (2007). Value-at-Risk and the Cross-section of 
Hedge Fund Returns. Journal of Banking and Finance, 31(4), 1135-1166. 
Bank of England. (2008). Financial Stability Report, October. (24). 
Bank of Japan. (2009a). Financial Statements of Japanese Banks for Fiscal 2008. 
Bank of Japan. (2009b). Financial System Report, September. 
Barnes, M.L., & Hughes, A.W. (2002). A Quantile Regression Analysis of the Cross 
Section of Stock Market Returns. Working Paper 02-2, Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. (2008). Consultative Proposals to 
Strengthen the Resilience of the Banking Sector Announced by the Basel Committee, 
17 December, 2008. 
Bharath, S.T., & Shumway, T. (2008). Forecasting Default with the Merton Distance-
to-Default Model. The Review of Financial Studies, 21(3), 1339-1369. 
International Journal of Business Studies – Special Edition 
21 
Buschinsky, M. (1994). Changes in the US Wasge Structure 1963-1987: Application 
of Quantile Regression. Econometrica, 162(2), 405-458. 
Caruana, J., & Narain, A. (2008). Banking on More Capital. International Monetary 
Fund, Finance & Development, 45(2). 
Crosbie, P., & Bohn, J. (2003). Modelling Default Risk. Retrieved 20 July 2011. 
Available at http://www.moodyskmv.com/research/files/wp/ModelingDefaultRisk.pdf 
Dimelis, S., & Lowi, H. (2002). Oxford Economic Papers. Oxford University Press, 
20(4), 445-465.  
Eide, E., & Showalter, M.H. (1998). The effect of school quality on student 
performance: a quantile regression approach. Economics Letters, Elsevier, 58(3), 345-
350. 
Engle, R., & Manganelli, S. (2004). CAViaR: Conditional Autoregressive Value at 
Risk by Regression Quantiles Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 22(4), 367-
381. 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. (2010). Failed Bank List. 
Gupta, A., & Liang, B. (2005). Do hedge funds have enough capital? A Value-at-Risk 
approach. Journal of Financial Economics, 77(1), 219-253. 
Gupton, G.M., Finger, C.C., & Bhatia, M. (1997). CreditMetrics - Technical 
Document. New York: J.P. Morgan & Co. Incorporated. 
Jackson, P., Maude, D.J., & Perraudin, W. (1998). Bank Capital and Value at Risk, 
Working paper Series No 79, Bank of England. 
Koenker, R., & Bassett, G., Jr. (1978). Regression Quantiles. Econometrica, 46(1), 
33-50. 
Koenker, R., & Hallock, K. (2001). Quantile Regression. Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 15(4), 143-156. 
Machado, J., & Mata, J. (2005). Counterfactual Decomposition of Changes in Wage 
Distributions Using Quantile Regressions. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 20(4), 
445-465. 
Merton, R. (1974). On the pricing of corporate debt: The risk structure of interest 
rates. Journal of Finance, 29, 449-470. 
Ohran, M., & Karaahmet, M. (2009). Risk Evaluation of Sectors Traded at the ISE 
with VaR Analysis. In G.N. Gregoriou (Ed.), The VaR Implementation Handbook. 
New York: McGraw Hill. 
Pflug, G. (2000). Some Remarks on Value-at-Risk and Conditional-Value-at-Risk. In 
R. Uryasev (Ed.), Probabilistic Constrained Optimisation: Methodology and 
Applications. Dordrecht, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Japanese Banks: Tail Risk and Capital Buffers 
22 
Powell, R., & Allen, D. (2009). CVaR and Credit Risk Management. Paper presented 
at the 18th World IMACS Congress and MODSIM09 International Congress on 
Modelling and Simulation. Modelling and Simulation Society of Australia and New 
Zealand and International Association for Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 
Cairns. 
Samanta, P., Azarchs, T., & Hill, N. (2005). Chasing Their Tails: Banks Look Beyond 
Value-At-Risk. RatingsDirect. 
Shirakawa, M. (2010). Uniqueness or Similarity? Japan’s Post-Bubble Experience in 
Monetary Studies, Keynote Address by the Governor of the Bank of Japan at Second 
IJCB Fall Conference hosted by the Institute for Monetary and Economic Studies, the 
Bank of Japan. Tokyo: Available at http://www.bis.org/review/r100920b.pdf. 
Steiner, A. (2011). Invesment Performance Analysis and Risk Management. Retrieved 
20 July 2011. Available at http://www.andreassteiner.net/performanceanalysis 
Sy, W. (2008). Credit Risk Models: Why They Failed in the Financial Crisis: APRA, 
wp0803. 
Tamaki, N. (2008). Bank Regulation in Japan. Executive Advisor to the Governor of 
the Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan. CeSifo Dice Report. 
Taylor, J.W. (2008). Using Exponentially Weighted Quantile Rergression to Estimate 
Value at Risk and the Expected Shortfall. Journal of Financial Econometrics, 6(3), 
282-406. 
Vassalou, M., & Xing, Y. (2004). Default Risk in Equity Returns. Journal of Finance, 
59, 831-868. 
  
International Journal of Business Studies – Special Edition 
23 
Figure 1a
Figure 1b
Figure 1c
-0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
0.0015
0.0020
0.0025
0.0030
0.0035
0.0040
0.0045
0.0050
0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035
Ja
pa
ne
se
 B
an
k 
A
ss
et
 F
lu
ct
ua
ti
on
s
Aggregate Benchmark
All Japanese Banks 
for 2000 - 2009
DD 2.49
DD 2.50
DD 2.53
DD 2.57
DD 2.60
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
Sh
iz
uo
ka
 B
an
k 
A
ss
et
 F
lu
ct
ua
ti
on
s
Aggregate Benchmark
Shizuoka Bank 
for 2000 - 20009
Top line: 95% Quantile
Second line: 90% Quantile
Middle line: 50% Quantile
Fourth line:10% Quantile
Bottom line: 5% Quantile
DD 3.22
DD 3.19
DD 3.10
DD 3.04DD 3.02
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.012
0.014
0.016
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004
Su
m
it
om
o 
M
it
su
i 
A
ss
et
 F
lu
ct
ua
ti
on
s
Aggregate Benchmark
Sumitomo Mitsui Bank Regression 
for 2000 - 2009
Top line: 95% Quantile
Second line: 90% Quantile
Middle line: 50% Quantile
Fourth line:10% Quantile
Bottom line: 5% Quantile DD 1.44
DD 1.37
DD 1.25
DD 1.10
DD 1.06
Top line: 95% Quantile
Second line: 90% Quantile
Middle line: 50% Quantile
Fourth line:10% Quantile
Bottom line: 5% Quantile
Table 1a Distance to Default
-5% 2.60 3.22 1.44
-10% 2.57 3.19 1.37
-50% 2.53 3.10 1.25
-90% 2.50 3.04 1.10
-95% 2.49 3.02 1.06
Table 1b F Test  - whole period quantile v benchmark
All Banks
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 4.6764 4.9339 5.1163
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Shizuoka Regional Bank
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 5.1527 5.5777 5.8452
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Sumitomo Financial Group
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 10.0833 13.5415 18.5508
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Quantile All Banks Shizuoka Sumitomo
Table 1c F Test  - whole period quantile v whole period stdev
All Banks
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.0916 1.0632
p 0.0127 0.0589
Significance * -
90% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD
F 0.9976 1.0023
p 0.5246 0.4769
Significance - -
Shizuoka Regional Bank
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.0853 1.0657
p 0.0183 0.0522
Significance * -
90% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.0342 1.2200
p 0.1950 <0.0001
Significance - **
Sumitomo Financial Group
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.4238 1.2766
p <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** **
90% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2200 1.2921
p <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** **
APPENDIX 1: QUANTILE REGRESSION FOR SELECTED BANKS (2000-2009) 
The y axis in each graph represents the individual bank daily asset fluctuations. The x axis is the pre-
GFC benchmark, calculated as discussed in Section V. The F test in table 1b tests for differences in 
volatility between the benchmark and each quantile for each selected bank. F is σ21/σ22, whereby a 
value of 1 shows no difference between the benchmark and the selected quantile and a value of 3 shows 
variance of 3x higher for the selected quantile as compared to the benchmark. * denotes significance at 
the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. Table 1c performs a similar F test to test for volatility 
differences between the selected quantile as compared to all quantiles. 
Japanese Banks: Tail Risk and Capital Buffers 
24 
Figure 2a
Figure 2b
Figure 2c
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035
Ja
pa
ne
se
 B
an
ks
 A
ss
et
 F
lu
ct
ua
ti
on
s
Aggregate Benchmark
All Japanese Banks 
for the GFC Period 2007 - 2009
DD 1.69
DD 1.62
DD 1.45
DD 1.35
DD 1.34
-0.001
0.000
0.001
0.002
0.003
0.004
0.005
0.006
0.007
0.008
0.009
0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035
Sh
iz
uo
ka
 B
an
k 
A
ss
et
 F
lu
ct
ua
ti
on
s
Aggregate Benchmark
Shizuoka Regional Bank  
for the GFC Period 2007 - 2009
Top line: 95% Quantile
Second line: 90% Quantile
Middle line: 50% Quantile
Fourth line:10% Quantile
Bottom line: 5% Quantile DD 2.37
DD 2.34
DD 2.20
DD 2.10
DD 2.07
-0.002
0.000
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.0000 0.0005 0.0010 0.0015 0.0020 0.0025 0.0030 0.0035
Su
m
it
om
o 
M
it
su
i 
A
ss
et
 F
lu
ct
ua
ti
on
s
Aggregate Benchmark
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group
for the GFC Period 2007 - 2009
Top line: 95% Quantile
Second line: 90% Quantile
Middle line: 50% Quantile
Fourth line:10% Quantile
Bottom line: 5% Quantile DD 0.80
DD 0.76
DD 0.67
DD 0.64
DD 0.63
Top line: 95% Quantile
Second line: 90% Quantile
Middle line: 50% Quantile
Fourth line:10% Quantile
Bottom line: 5% Quantile
Table 2a Distance to Default
-5% 1.69 2.37 0.80
-10% 1.62 2.34 0.76
-50% 1.45 2.20 0.67
-90% 1.35 2.10 0.64
-95% 1.34 2.07 0.63
Table 2b F Test  - GFC Quantile v benchmark
All Banks
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 2.3769 3.2292 3.7918
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Shizuoka Regional Bank
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 4.3616 5.0440 5.7094
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Sumitomo Financial Group
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 5.4652 7.7680 8.9920
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Quantile All Banks Shizuoka Sumitomo
Table 2c F Test  - GFC Quantile v GFC Stdev
All Banks
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2521 1.1536
p 0.0008 0.0229
Significance ** *
90% Quantile95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2493 1.2740
p 0.0009 0.0004
Significance ** **
Shizuoka Regional Bank
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.1267 1.0997
p 0.0477 0.0919
Significance * -
90% Quantile95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.1266 1.2444
p 0.0478 0.0011
Significance * **
Sumitomo Financial Group
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2813 1.1451
p 0.0003 0.0291
Significance ** *
90% Quantile95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2444 1.2841
p 0.0011 0.0002
Significance ** **
APPENDIX 2: QUANTILE REGRESSION FOR SELECTED BANKS (2007-2009) 
The y axis in each graph represents the individual bank daily asset fluctuations. The x axis is the pre-
GFC benchmark, calculated as discussed in Section V. The F test in table 2b tests for differences in 
volatility between the benchmark and each quantile for each selected bank. F is σ21/σ22, whereby a 
value of 1 shows no difference between the benchmark and the selected quantile and a value of 3 shows 
variance of 3x higher for the selected quantile as compared to the benchmark. * denotes significance at 
the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. Table 2c performs a similar F test to test for volatility 
differences between the selected quantile as compared to all quantiles. 
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Table 3a Distance to Default
-5% 1.11 1.60 0.24
-10% 1.09 1.54 0.24
-50% 1.03 1.38 0.21
-90% 0.88 1.26 0.19
-95% 0.87 1.26 0.18
Table 3b F Test  - 2008 quantile against benchmark
All Banks
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 4.8672 5.6985 7.9977
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Shizuoka Regional Bank
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 7.7182 10.4101 12.4431
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
Sumitomo Financial Group
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 50% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD DD
F 10.5001 14.1287 19.5344
p <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001
Significance ** ** **
SumitomoQuantile All Banks Shizuoka
Table 3c F Test  - 2008 quantile against 2008 stdev
All Banks
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2538 1.2045
p 0.0339 0.0664
Significance * -
90% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2548 1.3106
p 0.0334 0.0145
Significance * *
Shizuoka Regional Bank
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.2196 1.2196
p 0.0543 0.0543
Significance - -
90% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.3218 1.3218
p 0.0121 0.0121
Significance * *
Sumitomo Financial Group
Volatiliy Significance Testing: F Test:
5% Quantile 10% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.3232 1.3083
p 0.0119 0.0150
Significance * *
90% Quantile 95% Quantile
DD DD
F 1.1739 1.4059
p 0.0976 0.0030
Significance - **
APPENDIX 3: QUANTILE REGRESSION FOR SELECTED BANKS (2008) 
The y axis in each graph represents the individual bank daily asset fluctuations. The x axis is the pre-
GFC benchmark, calculated as discussed in Section V. The F test in table 3b tests for differences in 
volatility between the benchmark and each quantile for each selected bank. F is σ21/σ22, whereby a 
value of 1 shows no difference between the benchmark and the selected quantile and a value of 3 shows 
variance of 3x higher for the selected quantile as compared to the benchmark. * denotes significance at 
the 95% level and ** at the 99% level. Table 3c performs a similar F test to test for volatility 
differences between the selected quantile as compared to all quantiles.  
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APPENDIX 4: ALL JAPANESE BANKS USED IN THIS STUDY 
 
 
  
Bank Bank
77 Bank 2,167.6           62,938.6            Kagoshima Bank 1,476.4              35,879.3            
Aichi Bank 880.2              27,895.1            Kansai Urban Banking 1,140.8              46,008.2            
Akita Bank 777.7              25,629.5            Keiyo Bank 1,349.2              36,396.1            
Aomori Bank 494.2              23,702.1            Kita-Nippon Bank 239.9                 12,799.7            
AWA Bank 1,399.8           28,512.3            Kiyo Holdings 969.2                 38,952.6            
Bank of Iwate 1,071.2           27,039.6            Michinoku Bank 293.2                 19,840.0            
Bank of Kyoto 3,482.0           76,114.7            Mie Bank 373.5                 17,517.7            
Bank of Nagoya 832.7              32,433.7            Minato Bank 535.9                 31,311.7            
Bank of Okinawa 853.3              17,204.0            Mitsubishi UFJ Fin. Group 74,143.0            2,177,444.0       
Bank of Saga 488.9              21,489.3            Miyazaki Bank 533.5                 20,705.1            
Bank of the Ryukyus 442.4              17,493.0            Mizuho Financial Goup 30,658.4            1,666,529.0       
Bank of Yokohama 6,665.5           127,602.2          Mizuho Trust & Banking 5,054.6              63,021.2            
Chiba Bank 5,346.8           109,248.9          Musashino bank 974.1                 37,998.7            
Chiba Kogyo Bank 396.9              23,451.1            Nagano Bank 177.0                 9,522.9              
Chugoku Bank 3,122.8           64,670.8            Nanto Bank 1,546.2              48,528.3            
Chukyo Bank 661.5              17,603.9            Nishi-Nippon City Bank 2,348.9              77,515.1            
Chuo Mitsui Holdings 6,228.4           158,686.5          Ogaki Kyoritsu Bank 1,218.8              42,917.5            
Daisan Bank 512.2              18,892.4            Oita Bank 631.0                 28,959.9            
Daishi Bank 1,280.3           48,062.0            Resona Holdings 14,557.3            433,391.6          
Daito Bank 89.0                7,024.3              San-In Godo Bank 1,412.0              41,606.3            
Ehime Bank 499.0              19,026.1            Sapporo Hokuyo Holdings 1,412.0              41,606.3            
Eighteenth Bank 533.5              24,902.6            Shiga Bank 1,676.1              46,029.7            
Fukui Bank 773.8              23,268.7            Shikoku Bank 723.5                 27,095.7            
Fukushima Bank 123.0              6,440.7              Shimizu Bank 384.0                 14,421.7            
Gunma Bank 2,730.9           65,974.8            Shinsei Bank 2,375.0              121,551.7          
Hachijuni bank 2,988.6           65,859.9            Shizuoka bank 6,070.3              96,719.3            
Hiroshima Bank 2,610.4           67,668.8            Sumitomo Mitsui Fin. Group 46,197.4            1,310,262.0       
Hokkoku Bank 1,257.2           34,193.3            Sumitomo Trust & Bank 9,820.9              219,091.5          
Hokuetsu Bank 415.8              23,738.6            Suruga Bank 2,206.1              34,910.1            
Hokuhoku Financial Group 3,053.1           107,366.2          Tochigi Bank 496.6                 25,597.5            
Hyakugo Bank 1,222.0           45,447.9            Toho Bank 813.5                 33,650.9            
Hyakujushi Bank 1,199.7           41,076.7            Tohoku Bank 148.1                 7,093.5              
Iyo Bank 3,036.1           55,753.7            Tokyo Tomin Bank 521.8                 26,331.8            
Joyo Bank 3,449.1           79,141.7            Tomato Bank 242.6                 9,259.1              
Juroku Bank 1,445.3           46,543.1            
Total Market Capitalisation 275,251.9       
Total Assets 8,542,562.0    
Market 
Capitalisation 
(US $m)
Total Assets 
(US $m)
Market 
Capitalisation 
(US $m)
Total Assets 
(US $m)
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APPENDIX 5: PROFILE OF OUR TWO SELECTED BANKS 
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group  
Sumitomo Mitsui Financial Group (SMFG) is the holding company for Sumitomo 
Mitsui Banking, which is one of Japan’s largest banks (along with Mitsubishi UFJ and 
Mizuho). The bank's operations include retail, corporate, and investment banking; 
asset management; securities trading; and lending. Sumitomo Mitsui Banking has 
some 500 domestic branches and another 20 branches abroad. Other units of SMFG 
include credit card company Sumitomo Mitsui Card, brokerage SMBC Friend 
Securities, management consulting firm Japan Research Institute, and Sumitomo 
Mitsui Finance and Leasing. In the US it operates the California-based Manufacturer’s 
Bank. The bank had total assets of US$1.3 trillion at March 2010 financial year end, a 
total capital ratio of 15.02% and a tier I ratio of 11.15%. Out of the three mega 
Japanese banks, Sumitomo Mitsui has the highest total capital adequacy ratio. 
Shizuoka Regional Bank 
Shizuoka Regional Bank is headquartered in Shizuoka, Shizuoka Prefecture. It has 187 
domestic branches, primarily concentrated in the Tokai region between Tokyo and 
Osaka and overseas offices in Los Angeles, New York, Brussels, Hong Kong, Shanghai, 
and Singapore. Shizuoka Bank’s total assets stood at US$96.7 billion at March 2010 
with loans and bills discounted of US$64.6 billion. The bank’s capital adequacy ratio at 
the same time was 15.32%, one of the highest ratios among Japanese banks, and its Tier 
I ratio was 14.06%, substantially higher than the BIS standard of 8%. 
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